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Abstract
This article focuses on the costs and beneﬁ  ts of a ﬁ  scal consolidation in a small euro 
area economy. The macroeconomic impacts and the welfare analysis are conducted in 
a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model with non-Ricardian agents. We deﬁ  ne a 
benchmark ﬁ  scal consolidation strategy based on a permanent reduction in Government 
expenditure. We ﬁ  nd that, over the long run, ﬁ  scal consolidation leads to a considerable 
increase in the level of output and consumption, and is welfare improving. In addition, 
the gains are boosted if the ﬁ  scal strategy also involves a tax reform that shifts the tax 
burden away from labour income towards the ﬁ  nal goods consumption. However, 
important short-run costs arise, notably through output, consumption and welfare 
losses. Finally, we assess the effect of alternative ﬁ  scal consolidation paths in terms of 
its degree of front loading, speed of completion and interaction with the risk premium.
1. Introduction
The Great Recession triggered by the international ﬁ  nancial crisis led to the implementation of massive 
ﬁ  scal stimulus plans in many economies. In addition, the injection of public funds in many troubled 
ﬁ  nancial institutions assumed a crucial role in taming systemic risk. In this context, public debt increased 
substantially across developed economies, including the United States, euro area, the United Kingdom 
and Japan. These developments raised increasing concerns over public ﬁ  nances sustainability, bringing 
the discussion on the need of a ﬁ  scal consolidation to the center stage of the economic policy debate.
In a context of tense global ﬁ  nancing conditions created by increased risk aversion, the uncertainty on 
public ﬁ  nances sustainability in many economies led to a reappraisal of the sovereign debt risk pricing, 
which translated into an uneven increase in Government bond yields, in particular across euro area 
economies. These developments challenged the widely-held belief that the euro was a bulletproof vest 
against signiﬁ  cant risk price discrimination among participant economies, since the common monetary 
policy coupled with the Stability and Growth Pact rules were taken as almost ensuring perfect risk-sharing.
The international ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis put in evidence the heterogeneity of euro area economies 
and discredited the perfect risk sharing assumption. Euro area economies revealing more fragilities, 
including larger ﬁ  scal imbalances, asset price bubbles and/or increasing difﬁ  culties of the banking 
system in acceding wholesale international ﬁ  nancial markets, started to be discriminated in what 
respects debt pricing. More precisely, higher quality sovereign debt experienced a relative price increase 
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sagainst lower quality debt. In this context, restoring debt sustainability after the crises, evaluating the 
beneﬁ  ts of ﬁ  scal consolidation in the long-run and creating conditions for a successful consolidation 
process have become a major focus of the current economic literature (see Rother 2010, Mulas 2010 
and Barrios 2010).
This article focuses on the short, medium and long-run impacts on economic activity, demand condi-
tions and welfare of a ﬁ  scal consolidation based on speciﬁ  c ﬁ  scal policy measures, encompassing a 
permanent cut in government expenditure and a temporary increase in labour income taxes. Fiscal 
consolidation is deﬁ  ned herein as a permanent reduction in the public debt ratio. The impact of unbal-
ancing the ﬁ  scal instruments towards a stronger increase in consumption taxes in exchange for a smaller 
increase on taxation on labour income is also analyzed, which in the context of a small-open economy 
integrated in a monetary union is a possible way of implementing a real exchange rate devaluation, 
thereby regaining competitiveness and reducing the external imbalance. This might be an important 
objective in the case where the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit and the external deﬁ  cit (the “twin deﬁ  cits”) are a major 
concern of domestic authorities. The impact of alternative timings to complete the ﬁ  scal consolidation 
is also addressed. Finally, we consider the case in which the consolidation strategy restores credibility, 
bringing interest rates to levels below the pre-consolidation period.
The discussion is based on PESSOA, a New-Keynesian model for a small euro area economy. The struc-
ture of the article is as follows. The model is presented in section 2. Section 3 addresses the impact of 
alternative ﬁ  scal consolidation strategies, with alternative timings, on the main macroeconomic aggre-
gates and on welfare. Section 4 presents a scenario in which the ﬁ  scal consolidation is accompanied 
by a reduction in the domestic risk premium. Section 5 concludes and draws some policy implications.
2.  PESSOA: a model for a small euro area economy
PESSOA features a small open economy integrated in a fully-ﬂ  edged monetary union, the euro area.1 
Its structure mainly builds on the IMF’s model, Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model (GIMF), 
presented in Kumhof and Laxton (2007). It is assumed from the outset that the rest of the monetary 
union is not affected by domestic shocks, implying that monetary policy decisions are orthogonal to 
domestic developments as in Adolfson (2007). In the small open economy setup, the domestic economy 
is modeled in detail, while the rest of the monetary union modeling is very parsimonious. Contrary to 
most general equilibrium models in the literature on small open economy, PESSOA has intrinsic non-
Ricardian features: ﬁ  nitely-lived households in line with the stochastic ﬁ  nite lifetime framework (see 
Blanchard (1985), Yaari (1965), Buiter (1988) and Weil (1989)); distortionary taxation on households 
consumption, labour and capital income; and hand-to-mouth households (see Gali et al. (2007)). The 
ﬁ  scal block of the model is detailed enough to account for shocks over the several types of distortionary 
taxation, lump-sum transfers to households, and government expenditure.
Since PESSOA is designed for a small open economy integrated in a monetary union, the adjustment 
mechanism of the economy to domestic shocks is rather different from the standard general equilibrium 
model setup, in which monetary policy and real interest rate movements are crucial to render the model 
dynamically stable. In PESSOA, monetary policy is trivial in the sense that the domestic interest rate is 
orthogonal to domestic shocks and can only deviate from the rest of the union rate by a risk premium, 
1  See Almeida, V. Castro, G., Félix, R. M. and Maria, J. R. (2011) “Fiscal policy in a small euro area economy”, 

























































IIassumed to be constant. This implies that domestic shocks affecting domestic inﬂ  ation developments 
tend to generate powerful effects on the real interest rate, amplifying domestic economy ﬂ  uctuations. 
The dynamic stability of the model is ensured instead by an active role of the real exchange rate in 
the adjustment of international trade in goods and assets. Domestic agents in PESSOA are assumed 
to trade in goods and assets/debt solely with agents in the monetary union. Therefore, real exchange 
rate ﬂ  uctuations have sizeable impacts on competitiveness, trade and thus in the net foreign asset/
debt position of the economy. Since foreign prices developments are assumed to be independent of 
domestic shocks, the real exchange rate pins down uniquely the domestic price level.
The model is populated by two types of households: inter-temporal optimizers that can smooth out 
consumption by trading in domestic and foreign bonds; and hand-to-mouth households that can only 
perform intra-temporal optimization, since they do not access asset markets. Both types of households 
derive utility from consumption and leisure, which is modeled by means of a constant relative risk aver-
sion utility function and is subject to external habit formation.
Concerning the production block of the model, two types of ﬁ  rms are featured: manufacturers and 
distributors. All ﬁ  rms operate in monopolistic competition in their output markets, charging a mark-up 
over their marginal cost, and in perfect competition in their input markets, rewarding production factors 
at their marginal productivity. The model features a number of nominal and real rigidities that give rise 
to realistic short-run impacts and create room for stabilization policy.
The government consumes a particular good and performs transfers across households. To ﬁ  nance its 
activities, the government levies taxes on labour income, ﬁ  rms’ dividends and households’ consump-
tion and beneﬁ  ts from non-tax revenues, stemming from EU transfers. Furthermore, the government 
issues one-period bonds and pays an interest rate on the stock of bonds held from one period to the 
next, which might differ from the monetary union interest rate due to the risk-premium. To prevent a 
divergent debt path, a ﬁ  scal rule is imposed to ensure that the debt to GDP ratio converges to a pre-
speciﬁ  ed target value that uniquely pins down the ﬁ  scal balance.
3.  Macroeconomic effects of a ﬁ  scal consolidation
This section assesses the macroeconomic effects of a ﬁ  scal consolidation in a small euro area economy. 
Fiscal consolidation is deﬁ  ned as a permanent reduction in the target public debt ratio and is imple-
mented through a gradual ﬁ  scal tightening, followed by stabilization around the new steady-state 
level. Over time debt falls and so does Government interest outlays, which allows for a larger primary 
deﬁ  cit in the new steady-state.
The analysis presented in this section is conducted by implementing a set of ﬁ  scal policy simulations 
using the model described in section 2, to study the costs and beneﬁ  ts of ﬁ  scal consolidation. We 
analyze the effects of two alternative ﬁ  scal consolidation scenarios: a pure ﬁ  scal consolidation and a 
ﬁ  scal consolidation accompanied by a tax reform. Those scenarios are based on a very speciﬁ  c set of 
policy measures, which were selected partly on the basis of their macroeconomic impacts. Therefore, 
before discussing those scenarios, subsection 3.1 presents four simulations in which the impact of 
each available ﬁ  scal policy instrument on the main macroeconomic variables is analyzed in isolation to 
illustrate the main transmission channels.
Subsection 3.2 studies the transitional dynamic, the steady-state and the welfare impacts of a pure 
ﬁ  scal consolidation program and of a ﬁ  scal consolidation program accompanied by a tax reform. The 










sscenario it is examined whether costs can be minimized and beneﬁ  ts can be enhanced by a change 
in the policy mix.
In subsection 3.3 the pure ﬁ  scal consolidation scenario is expanded to implement a sensitivity analysis 
focused on the duration of the consolidation process. More speciﬁ  cally, we consider two alterna-
tive scenarios. The ﬁ  rst one evaluates the possibility of a protracted consolidation period (the “slow 
consolidation scenario”), which is characterized by a less aggressive policy towards reaching the target 
debt-to-GDP ratio. The second one considers a shorter consolidation period (the “fast consolidation 
scenario”) with a more aggressive policy towards reaching the target debt-to-GDP ratio.
Throughout this section, the ﬁ  scal consolidation experiments are all based on a permanent reduction in 
the public deﬁ  cit of 1 per cent of the initial steady-state GDP. Given the assumptions of the model for 
nominal interest rates and nominal GDP growth, around 4.5 and 4 per cent respectively, a permanent 
reduction in the public deﬁ  cit of 1 per cent of the initial steady-state GDP corresponds to a decline in 
the Government debt-to-GDP ratio of around 25 p.p. in the long-run. However, given the extremely 
long-lived dynamics of ﬁ  scal consolidation, changes in ﬂ  ows take literally decades to be fully reﬂ  ected 
in the corresponding public debt stock. Thus, in the following subsections impulse response functions 
are shown by lines for the ﬁ  rst 10 years and by points representing outcomes for longer horizons.
3.1.  The macroeconomic impact of alternative ﬁ  scal instruments
Chart 1 presents the results of 4 alternative ﬁ  scal consolidation instruments, with one ﬁ  scal instrument 
being used at a time  (transfers to households, Government consumption, tax burden on wage income2   
or consumption tax) to reach a reduction on the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit equal to 1 per cent of initial steady-state 
GDP. In each simulation, the remaining tax rates or spending components are held constant.
Starting with ﬁ  scal consolidation based on transfers to households, it affects macroeconomic outcomes 
mainly through their impact on households’ wealth and on the resulting responses of labour supply 
and private consumption.3 A reduction in transfers has a signiﬁ  cant negative wealth effect, leading to 
a drop in consumption and leisure and thus to an increase in labour supply.4 Rule-of-thumb households 
strongly cut their consumption and simultaneously increase hours worked to compensate foregone 
income. Consumption of asset holders is less affected, reﬂ  ecting expected dividend prospects and the 
possibility of consumption smoothing. Moreover, the shift in labour supply leads to lower real wages 
and to a decrease in the ﬁ  rm’s’ marginal costs implying a drop in domestic prices and a real exchange 
rate depreciation.
A ﬁ  scal consolidation based on a decrease in the demand for Government consumption goods, which 
are labour intensive, implies a reduction in labour demand. As a consequence, real wages decline and 
so households’ wealth and private consumption. In this simulation, unlike what happens in the case 
of transfers cuts, the impact in labour supply and consumption is similar for both types of households. 
Moreover, the Government consumption goods employ resources that would otherwise be available 
2  “Tax burden on wage income” corresponds to the labour income tax rate paid by employees and employers’ 
social security contributions, which are adjusted in equal magnitudes in terms of percentage point changes in 
their average tax rates.
3  For a detailed analysis on the impact of alternative ﬁ  scal instruments on the main macroeconomic variables and 
the implied transmission mechanisms see Almeida et al. (2010).
4  The underlying assumption behind the effect on labour supply is that all households act as labour suppliers, 
and therefore a cut in transfers induces a shift in labour supply. In practice, a part of the transfers are received 
































































































































































































Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9
Fiscal consolidation ﬁ  nanced with a decrease in government consumption
Fiscal consolidation ﬁ  nanced with a decrease in transfers
Fiscal consolidation ﬁ  nanced with an increase in the “tax burden on wage income”
Fiscal consolidation ﬁ  nanced with an increase in the consumption tax rate
Sources: Authors’ calculations using PESSOA. 
Notes: SS: initial steady-state. Inﬂ  ation, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining variables are in 










sto produce other types of goods and so a cut in Government consumption reduces demand side pres-
sures and contributes to a decrease in domestic prices and thus to international competitiveness gains, 
through real exchange rate depreciation.
Expenditure-based ﬁ  scal consolidation policies reduce demand pressures, promote a real exchange 
rate depreciation and beneﬁ  t the international competitiveness of domestic ﬁ  rms. The increase in 
competitiveness stimulates domestic production and factor demand and improves the external imbal-
ance, partly offsetting the recessionary impacts of ﬁ  scal consolidation. On the other hand, the fall 
in expected inﬂ  ation raises the real interest rate, exacerbating the decline in aggregate demand and 
amplifying the short-run recessive effect of ﬁ  scal consolidation.5
In turn, ﬁ  scal consolidation based on tax increases implies a protracted decline in output, private 
consumption and investment to levels below the steady-state. An increase in the labour income tax 
affects the economy mainly through its impact on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and leisure. Hence, a rise in the labour income tax discourages workers, implying a decrease in labour 
supply. At the same time, an increase in employers’ social security contributions leads to an increase 
in the marginal costs of ﬁ  rms and thus ﬁ  rms substitute labour for capital, reducing labour demand. 
Therefore, a rise in tax burden on wage income implies a decrease in hours worked and an increase in 
domestic prices, which implies a real exchange rate appreciation and a loss in competitiveness.
Regarding the consumption tax, it is far less distortionary of the consumption/leisure allocation than 
the tax burden on wage income. Changes in the consumption tax affect the economy mainly through 
the price transmission channel, reducing the real value of households’ wealth. This induces households 
to supply more labour in order to cushion the impact of the negative wealth effect on consumption, 
explaining the smaller decline in hours worked than in the case of the tax burden on wage income.
Accordingly, the tax burden on wage income is likely to be the instrument that involves higher short 
and medium term losses in terms of GDP, consumption and investment when used to perform ﬁ  scal 
consolidation. Consolidation strategies based on transfers and Government consumption cuts are the 
less penalizing for real GDP, private consumption and investment. These results suggest that expenditure 
cuts tends to dominate tax increases in a ﬁ  scal consolidation strategy (see Corsetti et al. 2009), which 
could be particularly true in the case of some European economies where taxes are high and where   
the recent period has been characterized by a huge rise in public expenditures. However, expenditure 
cuts are also likely to imply some reforms that take time to implement and so, in the short-run, taxes 
may help to speed up ﬁ  scal consolidation.
Therefore, we choose a ﬁ  scal consolidation strategy mainly based on expenditure cuts (Government 
consumption and transfers to households), but where tax burden on wage income adjusts endogenously, 
increasing slightly in the short-run in order to reach the lower target level for Government deﬁ  cit more 
quickly (henceforth the pure consolidation scenario).
3.2. Two  ﬁ  scal consolidation strategies: macroeconomic impact
This subsection analyses the impact on the main macroeconomic variables of two alternative ﬁ  scal 
consolidation scenarios that are based on speciﬁ  c ﬁ  scal instruments. The exercise is conducted assuming 
perfect foresight and full credibility of the ﬁ  scal authority and therefore the risk premium on Govern-
5  In models with endogenous monetary policy, the contractionary short-term impact of ﬁ  scal consolidation is 

























































IIment debt is not affected by the consolidation strategy. However, it should be highlighted that this 
assumption looks too strong at the current juncture and thus the results should be interpreted with 
caution. In fact, if an economy is facing high market pressures and a rise in the risk premium, a cred-
ible ﬁ  scal consolidation may reduce it, implying lower borrowing rates and therefore smaller short-run 
costs of ﬁ  scal consolidation (see section 4).
The ﬁ  rst scenario considers a pure ﬁ  scal consolidation strategy, which corresponds to a permanent 
reduction in the public deﬁ  cit of 1 per cent of initial steady-state GDP. The reduction in the deﬁ  cit is 
mainly achieved through spending cuts, which are the least penalizing ﬁ  scal instruments for economic 
activity (see subsection 3.1). More speciﬁ  cally, it is considered a permanent cut in Government consump-
tion and in transfers to households, each one contributing 0.5 per cent of initial steady-state GDP for 
the tightening. These measures are assumed to be gradually factored in over a period of four years. 
In the short-run, the adjustment to a lower deﬁ  cit level implies that the tax burden on wage income 
increases (Chart 2). However, as Government debt falls, interest payments will decline and the resulting 
saving may be used to ﬁ  nance either new tax cuts or public spending increases. We assumed that the 
savings are used to reduce tax burden on wage income over the medium and the long-run, since this 
instrument is the most distortionary and, therefore, a cut in tax burden on wage income enhances the 
impact of the ﬁ  scal consolidation on economic growth and welfare (this issue will be discussed below).
The second scenario considers a ﬁ  scal consolidation with a tax reform. Labour taxes or consumption taxes 
affect differently savings and labour supply decisions. It is often claimed that shifts towards increasing 
taxes on consumption and decreasing taxes on labour stimulate private saving and competitiveness, 
enhance economic growth and promote job creation, and improve the current account balance. This 
way, substituting labour income taxes by consumption taxes (as for e.g. VAT and special consumption 
taxes), is a competitiveness-enhancing tool and can be used to achieve a real exchange depreciation.
In this context, the scenario of ﬁ  scal consolidation with tax reform preserves the ﬁ  scal consolidation 
path, but adds a shift in the tax burden away from wage income towards consumption tax. In this 
scenario, it is assumed that the average consumption tax rate increases by 4 p.p.. The tax burden on 
wage income adjusts endogenously as in the previous exercise, but given the additional revenue gener-
ated by the consumption tax it increases by less in the short run and falls more substantially in the long 
run. Hence, in the case of the simulation without tax reform the tax burden on wage income remains 
above the baseline level during the ﬁ  rst 10 years and then starts to decline, whereas in the case with 
tax reform it only remains above the baseline level during the ﬁ  rst 3 years (Chart 2).
Chart 3 shows the short and long term impact on the main macroeconomic variables of the two ﬁ  scal 
consolidation scenarios. Regarding the short-tem, the pure consolidation scenario points to a fall in 
GDP, which reaches a trough in the second year (around 2.1 per cent below the steady state) and to 
a gradual recovery thereafter. This scenario leads to a protracted period of below-steady-state real 
GDP. Private consumption strongly decreases in the ﬁ  rst years, due not only to the direct impact of 
ﬁ  scal measures on wealth, but also to its impact on the real interest rate, which increases the return 
on savings, measured in terms of future consumption, and implies a further disincentive to present 
consumption. The negative impact on consumption and investment is slightly reduced in the short-run 
by the anticipation of more favorable future wealth prospects due to expected lower distortionary 
taxes. On the other hand, the decrease in the price level leads to a gain in international competitive-
ness, which implies an increase in the exports market share and a decline in the import content of 











sIn the case of a ﬁ  scal consolidation accompanied by a tax reform, it is assumed a permanent increase 
in the consumption tax, allowing a higher reduction of the tax burden on wage income in the new 
steady-state, which in a rational expectations framework is fully anticipated by households. Hence, the 
tax reform reduces distortions in the economy, promoting a higher labour utilization and an increase in 
international competitiveness, and therefore has a positive impact on GDP. Output decline is smaller in 
the short-run than in the pure ﬁ  scal consolidation scenario, reaching a trough in the ﬁ  rst year (around 
1.6 per cent below the steady state) and starting to recover thereafter. The period of below-steady-
state real GDP is substantially shortened, from 10 years in the pure consolidation scenario to 6 years 
in the scenario with tax reform.
Overall, it can be concluded that a ﬁ  scal consolidation has unavoidable contractionary short-run effects 
on economic activity, in particular on consumption and investment. At the same time, an expansion 
in net exports usually occurs, partly offsetting the negative impact of domestic demand on GDP.   
Moreover, it can be concluded that short-run costs can be limited by changing the policy mix towards 
less distortionary taxation.
Regarding the long-run effects, chart 3 also sheds some light on the following question: Does ﬁ  scal 
consolidation generate long-term beneﬁ  ts?
Lower public debt reduces the burden of Government interest payments over the longer time horizon, 
which in the simulations illustrated in chart 3 is used to reduce the tax burden on wage income. In the 
case of a ﬁ  scal consolidation without tax reform, the tax burden on wage income declines 3.3 p.p. in 
the new steady-state. Hence, households’ after-tax real wage increases, raising the opportunity cost of 
leisure and therefore leading to an increase in labour supply. At the same time, labour costs of ﬁ  rms fall 
and labour demand increases, leading to a rise in the marginal product of capital and fostering capital 
accumulation. The increase in households’ wealth, due to the increase in wage income and capital 
accumulation, boosts consumption and investment and therefore real GDP. In the long-run, real GDP 
is 2.5 per cent above the initial steady state.
Chart 2 
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THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION SCENARIOS WITH AND WITHOUT TAX 



























































































































Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y20 Y40 LR Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y20 Y40 LR
      Without tax reform                X With tax reform
Sources: Authors’ calculations using PESSOA. 
Notes: SS: initial steady-state. Inﬂ  ation, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining variables are in 











IMPACT ON WELFARE OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION SCENARIOS | COMPENSATING VARIATION IN CONSUMPTION, IN 
PERCENTAGE
Discount rate 2.8% 6.3% 30%
Average planing horizon of agents (years) Long run 36 16 3
Fiscal consolidation without tax reform 7.9 1.5 -3.4 -8.9
Fiscal consolidation with tax reform 10.4 3.5 -1.9 -8.2
Sources: Authors’ calculations using PESSOA. 
In the case of a ﬁ  scal consolidation with tax reform the qualitative effects are quite similar, but the 
magnitudes are ampliﬁ  ed. The tax burden on wage income declines 5.8 p.p. in the new steady-state 
and real GDP is 3.5 per cent above the initial steady-state, which is signiﬁ  cantly higher than the impact 
of a pure ﬁ  scal consolidation scenario.
The decrease in public debt implies a decline in the net foreign liabilities-to-GDP ratio of the small-
open economy. Hence, the temporary trade balance improvement mentioned in the short-run analysis, 
mainly due to the real exchange rate depreciation, declines gradually, resulting in a lasting trade deﬁ  cit 
ﬁ  nanced by a lower burden of interest payments on foreign debt in order to ensure that the net foreign 
liabilities stabilize at a lower level.
Finally, the effects of a ﬁ  scal consolidation can also be assessed by analyzing the impact on households’ 
welfare. We consider a discrete time counterpart of the suggestion of Calvo (1988), which has also been 
used in Ganelli (2005) and Kumhof et al. (2008). Welfare analysis can be seen as a benchmark metric 
for the impact of a particular policy experiment, as measured through the aggregate lifetime utility, 
which is a function of the goods valued by households (consumption and leisure in the case at hand).6 
Hence, welfare corresponds to a weighted average of the utility of individuals alive in current and future 
periods, where a weighting factor reﬂ  ects the importance of future generations in the welfare from the 
viewpoint of the policymaker. The welfare impact is synthesized in the standard compensated variation 
of consumption measure proposed in Lucas (1987), which transforms utility into corresponding units 
of consumption good in the initial steady-state. Table 1 presents the impact on households’ welfare 
measured by the compensated consumption variation from a ﬁ  scal consolidation with and without 
tax reform, according to four different average planning horizons. As the planning horizon increases 
the gains from consolidation in terms of households’ welfare also increase. In the pure consolidation 
scenario households’ welfare, in aggregate terms, varies from -8.9 per cent, if the planning horizon is 
very short, to 7.9 per cent, in a long term planning horizon. In scenario with tax reform, the welfare 
losses are smaller in the short-run and the gains are higher in the long-run.
As mentioned before, we have assumed that the ﬁ  scal room created by lower interest rate payments 
on outstanding Government debt is used to lower the tax burden on wage income. This assumption 
was selected on the basis of its macroeconomic impact, as illustrated in table 2. This table compares 
the long run impacts of a pure ﬁ  scal consolidation if savings on the burden of interest payments are 
used to cut consumption tax or to raise one of the spending components (Government consumption 
or transfers to households) instead of using them to cut the tax burden on wage income.
6 In  PESSOA, it is assumed that public consumption is not valued by households in the utility function. In real-
ity, public consumption expenses are used in the provision of public goods and services, which are valued by 
households. In this context, the reduction in public consumption considered in this article should always be 
seen as an increase of government efﬁ  ciency in broad sense, achieved through both an increase in the efﬁ  -
ciency in the provision of goods and services actually valued by households, and an elimination of the spending 

























































IIThe results points to positive long-run impacts on economic activity from ﬁ  scal consolidation, regardless 
of the  strategy chosen, except in the case that the ﬁ  scal authority uses the improvement in the ﬁ  scal 
position to raise transfers.7 The positive effects on output vary from around 0.5 per cent (increase in 
Government consumption) to 2.5 per cent (cut in tax burden on wage income). When the ﬁ scal authority 
uses public savings on interest payments to cut the consumption tax, real GDP increases around 1.4 per 
cent. Thus, stronger positive impacts on GDP and in all private expenditure came from using savings 
to cut tax burden on wage income, which is in line with the standard view of relative distortionary 
features of the different ﬁ  scal instruments. Reducing this tax burden also seems the preferred option 
if we consider welfare analysis (see last row of table 2).
It can be concluded that despite the short-run costs of ﬁ  scal consolidation, in the long-run a lower 
Government debt-to-GDP ratio has positive impacts on economic activity, enhancing private consump-
tion and investment and exports, and increasing households’ welfare. Moreover, the change in the 
ﬁ  scal structure, in particular reducing the tax burden on wage income and increasing the consumption 
tax, is beneﬁ  cial not only to reduce the short-run costs of ﬁ  scal consolidation but also to boost the 
long-run beneﬁ  ts. In short, a reduction of ﬁ  scal distortions has a sizeable expansionary effect on the 
economy and positive effects on aggregate welfare.
Finally, it is worth recalling that the analysis presented in this section does not take into account the 
probability that reduced Government debt affects the foreign risk premium on euro area interest rates 
(this possibility is explored in section 4).
3.3.  Alternative timings for ﬁ  scal consolidation
In this subsection we illustrate the impact of alternative timings to complete the ﬁ  scal consolidation. 
The scenarios differ in the time horizon in which the new target for the debt-to-GDP ratio is reached: 
the benchmark scenario (which corresponds to the one illustrated in chart 2 without tax reform), the 
“slow consolidation scenario” and the “fast consolidation scenario”. The time by which half of the 
reduction in the target debt ratio is reached is 8 years, 19 years and 4 years, respectively. It is worth 
7  This result is conditioned by the assumption that all households act as labour suppliers and therefore a cut in 
transfers induces an increase in labour supply.
Table 2
THE MACROECONOMIC AND WELFARE IMPACTS FROM THE BUDGETARY CLEARANCE OBTAINED WITH 
THE LOWER INTEREST RATE BURDEN | IN PERCENTAGE







Raise transfers to 
households
GDP 2.5 1.4 0.5 -0.4
Private consumption 4.6 3.1 -0.2 0.8
Private investment 1.5 0.7 0.6 -0.3
Exports 1.7 0.7 -0.5 -0.7
Imports 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.2
Hours 2.1 1.0 0.4 -0.6
Real wage rate 2.3 4.1 0.2 0.2
Real exchange rate 0.7 0.3 -0.2 -0.3
Compensating variation in consumption (in SS) 12.1 8.8 -1.6 3.7
Sources: Authors’ calculations using PESSOA. 










smentioning that, similar to previous simulations, our analysis is conducted under the assumption of 
perfect foresight, full credibility of the ﬁ  scal authority and unchanged sovereign risk premium. The 
results are summarized in chart 4.
A front-loading ﬁ  scal consolidation – the “fast consolidation scenario” – implies a deep recession, with 
signiﬁ  cant losses in output, consumption, investment and hours worked in the short term. On the other 
hand, a slow ﬁ  scal consolidation, with a longer duration of the consolidation period, implies smaller 
output, consumption and investment losses and a smaller reduction in hours worked in the short and 
medium term, but a more protracted period of below steady-state GDP. Moreover, improvements in 
the competitiveness of domestic ﬁ  rms’, which takes place in all scenarios, are more limited in the case 
of a slow consolidation strategy.
Table 3 presents the welfare costs and beneﬁ  ts for the 3 scenarios. Results show that for short-term 
horizons the slow consolidation scenario implies lower welfare losses, and therefore current genera-
tions may prefer this ﬁ  scal policy strategy. As the planning horizon increases, the difference between 
the alternative ﬁ  scal consolidation strategies in terms of costs and beneﬁ  ts narrows and therefore a 
slow consolidation may no longer be the optimal strategy for future generations.
The above results suggest that in general a credible and slow ﬁ  scal adjustment implies in the short-
run lower output and welfare costs.8 However, it should be emphasized that results are conditioned 
by the assumption of an unchanged risk premium. In the current juncture, characterized by high risk 
premium on sovereign debt of some euro area economies and a low risk tolerance among investors, 
this assumption does not seem very realistic. In this context, section 4 offers some evidence regarding 
the importance of considering the likely impact of risk premium changes.
4.  Fiscal consolidation with a decrease in the risk premium
In the scenarios presented in section 3 it is assumed that the risk premium on Government debt is not 
affected by the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, in the current juncture, characterized by high 
risk premium on sovereign debt of some euro area economies and a low risk tolerance among inves-
tors, the assumption of an unchanged risk premium does not seem very realistic. 
This section presents a simple exercise to illustrate the importance of considering the role of the risk 
premium in the analysis of the costs and beneﬁ  ts of ﬁ  scal consolidation. The discussion of the impact of 
ﬁ  scal consolidation in a context of a small open economy that faces a high risk premium is particularly 
relevant in the current juncture. However, in PESSOA the risk premium is orthogonal to macroeconomic 
8  For a similar result see Coenen (2008).
Table 3
WELFARE ASSESSMENT – COMPENSATING VARIATION IN CONSUMPTION | IN PERCENTAGE
Discount rate 2.8% 6.3% 30%
Average planing horizon of agents (years) Long run 36 16 3
Alternative timings for ﬁ  scal consolidation
Slow consolidation scenario 7.2 1.4 -2.1 -3.9
Benchmark scenario 7.9 1.5 -3.4 -8.9
Fast consolidation scenario 7.9 0.7 -5.6 -14.8


























































THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION SCENARIOS WITH ALTERNATIVE TIMINGS | 





































































































































Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y20 Y40 LR Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y20 Y40 LR
 X Slow consolidation scenario                    Benchmark scenario                    Fast consolidation scenario
Sources: Authors’ calculations using PESSOA. 
Notes: SS: initial steady-state. Inﬂ  ation, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining variables are in 












FISCAL CONSOLIDATION SCENARIO – EVOLUTION OF THE RISK PREMIUM | DEVIATIONS FROM THE INITIAL 













Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y20 Y40 LR Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y20 Y40 LR
 x   0.995
Y r =                         0.98
Y r =                             0.75
Y r =
Sources: Authors’ calculations using PESSOA. 
Note: The three considered trajectories differ in the convergence velocity of the risk premium to the ﬁ  nal steady state value.
developments and does not reﬂ  ect probabilities of default. In this context, an ad-hoc exercise was 
implemented to illustrate the impact of a reduction in the risk premium as a credible ﬁ  scal consolidation 
is implemented. The initial steady state of the pure ﬁ  scal consolidation scenario was changed in order 
to include a risk premium of 100 basis points in the small open economy. As the observed debt-to-GDP 
ratio converges to a lower target level, the risk premium decreases and reaches zero in the ﬁ  nal steady-
state. The risk premium () t Y  is modeled as a shock that follows a ﬁ  rst-order auto-regressive process:
() 1 ln 1 ln ln tt t rr e
YY Y
- Y= - Y + Y +
Where r
Y  is the persistence parameter,  Y  is the steady-state risk premium and  t e
Y  stands for time t
independent and identically distributed zero mean innovation. chart 5 presents 3 alternative trajectories 
for the risk premium, which differ on the calibration of parameter r
Y .
Chart 6 shows the results of the pure ﬁ  scal consolidation scenario accompanied by a reduction in the 
risk premium, considering the three above-mentioned trajectories. The results point to a signiﬁ  cant 
impact of a decrease in the risk premium on domestic demand and economic activity. The evolution of 
the risk premium directly affects households and ﬁ  rms decisions, stimulating both private consumption 
and private investment. The decrease in the risk premium implies, on the one hand, a lower discount 
rate on future income, which increases net wealth and has a positive effect on households’ consump-
tion. On the other hand, the decrease in the domestic interest rate and the higher demand prospects 
implies a higher desired capital stock level and thus has a positive impact on private investment. 
Additionally, the decrease in Government interest outlays implies a lower increase of the tax burden 
on wage income in the short-run and a more substantial fall in the long run, which leads to positive 
effects on households’ wealth enhancing the impact on economic growth.
The gains of ﬁ  scal consolidation in terms of households’ welfare are enhanced and the short-term costs 


























































THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF A FISCAL CONSOLIDATION SCENARIO WITH A DECREASE IN THE 










































































































































Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y20 Y40 LR Y1 Y3 Y5 Y7 Y9 Y20 Y40 LR
  X   0.995
Y r =                                          0.98
Y r =                                        0.75
Y r =
Sources: Authors’ calculations using PESSOA. 
Notes: SS: initial steady-state. Inﬂ  ation, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining variables are in 










scase of a sharp decrease in the risk premium () 0.75 r
Y = , ﬁ  scal consolidation leads to gains in current 
generations’ welfare even for very short planning horizons. This is largely explained by the behavior 
of consumption, which increases relative to the initial steady state, even in the short-run, while hours 
worked show a decreasing path over the ﬁ  rst three years.
Although the reduction in the risk premium is ad-hoc, it clearly shows the importance of taking risk 
premium effects into account in the discussion of the gains and costs of ﬁ  scal consolidation. The 
results point to lower short-term costs and higher long-term beneﬁ  ts if the reduction in public debt 
is accompanied by a reduction in the risk premium, implying that short-term costs of ﬁ  scal consolida-
tion are smaller in economies that face higher market pressures. Moreover, in a scenario of a sizeable 
immediate decrease in the risk premium, the impact of the ﬁ  scal consolidation may even be positive 
in the short-run, both in terms of GDP growth and households’ welfare. This result is in line with the 
literature that highlights that ﬁ  scal contractions can have expansionary effects in some situations, namely 
if conﬁ  dence in a country’s public ﬁ  nance is low and the ﬁ  scal consolidation is pursued in a credible 
and consistent manner, fostering the sustainability of public ﬁ  nances in the long term.
The above results suggest that the appropriate ﬁ  scal consolidation strategy may not be identical for all 
economies. Sharp corrections are probably needed in countries that already face high and increasing 
foreign risk premium. Mild corrections are nevertheless more desirable if the risk premium is in a more 
comfortable situation and is not very sensible to ﬁ  scal developments.
5. Conclusions
In the present juncture, a credible ﬁ  scal consolidation strategy seems necessary in many euro area 
countries to bring the public debt ratio to a sustainable path. Moreover, some economies have been 
facing a surge in sovereign debt spreads and are being forced to take immediate and rapid measures 
to ensure the access of the public sector to the sovereign debt markets. However, debt reduction is 
painful for slow-growing economies, since it may imply a reduction of economic activity and welfare 
losses in the short-run. At the same time, lowering debt and thus reducing interest rate payments on 
outstanding government debt will bring long run beneﬁ  ts. In this context, evaluating the costs and 
beneﬁ  ts of ﬁ  scal consolidation and creating the conditions for a successful consolidation process have 
become an important policy issue.
This article analyses the impact on the macroeconomic scenario and on households’ welfare of alter-
native ﬁ  scal consolidation strategies, using a dynamic general equilibrium model with non-Ricardian 
features (PESSOA). Simulations show that a ﬁ  scal consolidation, in general, implies a trade-off between 
the short-run costs and the long-run beneﬁ  ts. We also conclude that consolidation strategies based 
Table 4
WELFARE ASSESSMENT – COMPENSATING VARIATION IN CONSUMPTION | IN PERCENTAGE
Discount rate 2.8% 6.3% 30%
Average planing horizon of agents (years) Long run 36 16 3
Fiscal consolidation with decrease in the risk premium
r
Y = 0.995 24.5 11.9 3.4 -5.6
r
Y = 0.98 29.8 19.1 10.5 -0.8
r
Y = 0.75 31.7 23.9 17.2 6.9

























































IIon transfers to households and Government consumption cuts are the less penalizing for real GDP, 
private consumption, investment and welfare in the short-run. At the same time, long-term gains of 
ﬁ  scal consolidation are enhanced if the ﬁ  scal room created by lower Government interest outlays on 
outstanding debt is used to cut distortionary taxes, in particular, on labour. Therefore, well-designed 
consolidation strategies could minimize the short-term costs and enhance the long-run beneﬁ  ts. Addi-
tionally, we show that gains can be boosted if the ﬁ  scal consolidation strategy involves a tax reform that 
shifts the tax burden away from labour services towards the households’ consumption expenditures, 
in a deﬁ  cit-neutral way, encouraging savings and labour supply and enhancing competitiveness by a 
real exchange rate depreciation.
The results also suggest that a front-loading ﬁ  scal consolidation implies a deeper recession, with signiﬁ  cant 
short-term losses in output, consumption, investment, hours worked and welfare, when compared with 
a more gradual consolidation strategy. Thus, if possible, a credible slow ﬁ  scal adjustment is in general 
more beneﬁ  cial for the economy, a result that is in line with the literature pointing to the optimality 
of tax smoothing. However, those results are conditioned by the assumption of an unchanged risk 
premium and, therefore, do not take into account the likelihood that domestic interest rates could be 
correlated with the debt level. In this case, the balance of short-run costs and long-run beneﬁ  ts might 
be quite different. The results show that if a ﬁ  scal consolidation strategy is pursued in a credible and 
consistent manner and implies a signiﬁ  cant decrease in the risk premium on domestic interest rates, 
the short-term costs are reduced and, in extreme cases, the short-run impact may be expansionary. 
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